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This essay challenges the historiography of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar, India. Drawing on 
colonial and postcolonial source materials, in addition to contemporary discussions and scholarship that places 
the 1919 events in the context of the longue durée of British colonial violence and historiography, this essay 
assesses the appropriateness of a potential centenary apology by the British. 
 
 
 
 
The Amritsar massacre remains one of the most 
important and controversial events of British 
rule in India. Yet, many historians have 
struggled to interpret it due to the ways in 
which, in isolation, it can appear as an 
aberration. On the 13th of April 1919, Brigadier 
Reginald Dyer led fifty of his riflemen, 
composed of regiments of Gurkhas and Sikhs, 
to the Jallianwala Bagh where an estimated 
20,000 Indians had gathered. A square wholly 
enclosed by the backs of houses and boundary 
walls, Jallianwala Bagh had only four narrow 
exits, which were broad enough for just two 
people to use at a time. A little after 5 p.m., 
Dyer led his troops in to face the crowd and 
within thirty seconds, without warning, opened 
fire on them. After firing approximately 1650 
                                                 
1 Alfred Draper, Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the 
Raj (London, 1981), pp.1-10. 
rounds, Dyer marched his troops out of the 
square.1 Britain placed the official death count 
at 379, but Indian estimates have ranged to over 
1000.2 The disagreement over the number of 
deaths is typical of the uncertainty and debate 
surrounding the massacre.  
On the face of it, the massacre appears to 
be a vastly cruel overreaction by Dyer to a 
crowd supposedly defying his proclamation 
against meetings, and therefore evidence of 
either a brutal state or one crazed officer. 
British historiographies commonly view the 
event as singularly atrocious and 
unrepresentative of the wider Raj. Indian 
historiographies, on the other hand, analyse the 
massacre as signifying the crystallisation of 
triumphant British brutality, which meant that 
2 Savita Nahrain, The Historiography of Jallianwala 
Bagh (London 1994), p. 1.  
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India could no longer justify being under 
‘benign’ British rule and led to the nationalist 
movement and independence. Two traits shared 
by these conventional perspectives is their 
acceptance of the strength of the British Raj, 
and of violence being a fundamentally new and 
un-British development, hence its analysis in 
isolation. Accordingly, the common 
periodisation of the massacre fits within the 
brackets of 1918-1947, following the idea that 
the First World War constituted the watershed 
moment. Influential is the idea put forward by 
Akira Iriye that ‘the Great War proved to be the 
Swan song of Empires.’3 However, a growing 
volume of scholarship, regarding the empire 
state in the nineteenth century, has revealed 
both weakness and insecurity as key traits, with 
violence being continually utilised out of panic 
and anxiety.4  
This essay will begin with an assessment 
of the highly influential and much-cited speech 
by Churchill, before moving on to examine the 
problematic historiography and the uses and 
abuses made of the event in seeking 
reductionist conclusions of culpability. In light 
of recent historiographical developments and 
by placing the massacre within its broader 
historical context, the concluding part of this 
essay will explore the appropriateness of 
Cameron’s 2013 statement at Jallianwala Bagh 
and discuss the renewed calls for an apology 
made in 2017, by both Shashi Tharoor and 
Sadiq Khan.5 
 
                                                 
3 Akira Iriye, quoted in Kim Wagner, ‘Calculated to 
Strike Terror: The Amritsar Massacre and the Spectacle 
of Colonial Violence’, Past and Present 233 (2016), p. 
196. 
4 Mark Condos, The Insecurity State (London, 2017). 
5 Shashi Tharoor, Inglorious Empire: What the British 
Did to India (London 2017), p.8; Sadiq Khan, cited in 
London Assembly (2017) Mayor of London makes 
historic visit to the Golden Temple in Amritsar. 
Available at https://www.london.gov.uk/press-
Historiographies of the Jallianwala Bagh 
massacre: British, Indian and sociological  
British historiography has obscured and 
marginalised its colonial guilt. Long-term 
continuities have been masked by the 
emphasised singularity of events such as the 
Amritsar massacre and the British response to 
the Mau-Mau rebellion. There has been a 
marked reluctance amongst imperial historians 
to engage in scholarship regarding lesser-
known yet analogous instances. Where 
continuities have been recognised they have 
been with regards to other European countries, 
stressing the supposedly un-British nature of 
the atrocities. Susan Kent, a British historian, 
has argued that ‘[w]ith Amritsar…the 
country…had behaved in ways of the enemy 
only recently defeated’; whereas regarding the 
British response to the Mau-Mau rebellion, 
Eric Griffith-Jones, a British lawyer who 
served as Attorney General of Kenya from 
1955 to 1961, claimed that British practice was 
‘distressingly reminiscent of conditions in Nazi 
Germany or Communist Russia’. 6 Seemingly, 
the fact that such actions were typical of brutal 
British counter-insurgency is hidden by British 
defeat of genocidal opponents.  
British representations of the massacre 
have been highly influenced by Churchill’s 
response. In a parliamentary speech, Churchill 
claimed the massacre was ‘an episode without 
precedent or parallel in the history of the British 
Empire… It is an extraordinary event, a 
monstrous event, an event which stands in 
singular and sinister isolation’.7 Asquith 
releases/mayoral/visit-to-the-golden-temple-in-amritsar-
0 (Accessed: 07 February 2018). 
6 Susan Kent, Aftershocks: Politics and Trauma in 
Britain, 1918-1931 (New York 2005), p. 85; Eric 
Griffith-Jones, quoted in Patricia Owens, Economy of 
Force: Counterinsurgency and the Historical Rise of the 
Social (Cambridge, 2015), p. 179. 
7 Winston Churchill quoted in Lachlan Cranswick (2008) 
Winston Churchill's Amritsar Massacre Speech - July 
8th, 1920, U.K. House of Commons. Available at 
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agreed: ‘there has never been such an incident 
in the history of our empire from its inception 
to the present day’.8 By emphasising its 
singularity, Churchill and Asquith were able to 
condemn the event yet allow the image of 
empire to remain relatively untarnished. 
Churchill claimed, ‘this is not the British way 
of doing business’, highlighting that the 
atrocity was not a British responsibility.9 It was 
instead solely attributable to one-man, 
Brigadier Reginald Dyer. Synchronously, the 
nationalist Indian congress report described the 
action as ‘un-British’, as if there was some 
defined Britishness that had been defied. The 
British necessity to detach from violence is 
explained by longstanding ideas of civility, as 
well as ideologies of ‘exceptional’ minimum 
force. The British, unlike the French or 
Germans, supposedly did not bring violence to 
their empire but civility and justice, employing 
their specific skill in obtaining ‘hearts and 
minds’. Bailkin has identified a ‘longstanding 
mythic “peaceableness” of the British and the 
British investment in the rule of law.’ 10 
Standing in opposition to the implicit threat of 
violence which upheld British colonial rule, 
this myth obscures the historical reality, 
influencing successive historiographies.  
Churchill’s condemnation of Jallianwala 
Bagh was arguably made solely to preserve the 
constructed image of the empire necessary for 
its continuation. This was due to the basis of the 
empire in India; in 1873 it was argued that the 
supposed rule of law constituted ‘a moral 
conquest more striking, more durable, and far 
more solid, than the physical conquest which 
                                                 
http://lachlan.bluehaze.com.au/churchill/am-text.htm 
(Accessed: 29 January 2018). 
8 Herbert Asquith, quoted in Ibid. 
9 W. Churchill, quoted in Ibid. 
10Jordanna Bailkin, ’The Boot and the Spleen: When 
Was Murder Possible in British India?’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 48 (2006), pg.470. 
rendered it possible.’11 That Churchill’s 
assessment of Jallianwala Bagh was not due to 
a conscience with regards to innocent Indian 
life, is observable from his conduct towards 
India during World War Two. Churchill, over 
this time, diverted food stocks away from India, 
leaving millions starving. He did this not to 
feed starving people, but to build stockpiles of 
food in Europe. His argument was that the 
Indians were a ‘beastly people with a beastly 
religion’ and that it was their own fault for 
‘breeding like rabbits’.12 Churchill harboured 
no respect for Indian nationalism, peevishly 
questioning ‘why is Gandhi not dead?’.13 
Due to its purported singularity and un-
British nature, the massacre has been viewed 
within Britain as outside the national history 
and aberrant, and therefore not a matter for 
national guilt or intense scholarship.14 This has 
highly limited British historiography. Two 
groups have dominated: historians of a military 
background for whom the event does constitute 
a matter of interest, being an important point in 
the practice of counter-insurgency, and popular 
writers who, attracted to the drama of the event, 
seek to bring the massacre to a wider audience. 
Neither of these groups have sufficiently 
tackled the complicated long-term issues 
surrounding the massacre. Generally, they have 
accepted the exceptional horror of the event and 
sought to explain it through Dyer’s 
individuality, investing in the relative 
guiltlessness of the wider empire.  
Nigel Collett (an ex-officer) in 2005 
penned the strongest example of this approach, 
one hailed within British reviews as ‘surely the
11 Fitzjames Stephen, quoted in Frances Hutchins, The 
Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India 
(New Jersey 1967), p.126. 
12 W. Churchill, quoted in S. Tharoor, Inglorious Empire, 
p.116. 
13 Churchill quoted in Ibid., p. 116. 
14 Derek Sayer, ‘British Reaction to the Amritsar 
Massacre 1919-1920’, Past & Present, 131 (1991), p. 
132. 
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last word on Amritsar’.15 Collett argues, 
following Churchill’s line, that since Dyer is 
‘unique’ and ‘stands alone in British history’, 
the massacre is an event which can only be 
understood through biography, stating ‘it is 
therefore to his life to which we must turn for 
an understanding’.16 Ian Colvin, a British right-
wing journalist who was lead-writer for The 
Morning Post from 1909 to 1937, wrote a 
biography, under commission from Dyer’s wife 
Anne in 1929 that tenuously praised the actions 
of Dyer and the army. However, due to its 
source and omission of key details, it was 
derided as a ‘hagiography’.17 Collett 
conversely condemns Dyer, evoking the 
creation of ‘the Butcher’ through events largely 
outside the imperial system. Described is a 
quiet boy who developed a fear of ridicule 
through being a butt of both bullying and 
classmates’ jokes, and displayed unpredictable 
outbursts of violence from a young age. Collett 
links this to Dyer’s bizarre statement that he 
continued to fire due to a fear that if he stopped 
‘they would come back and laugh at me’.18 
However, an 1896 work – Small Wars: Their 
Principles and Practice, an official British 
Army textbook that is still regarded by many 
military practitioners as a ‘masterpiece’ – states 
that ‘Uncivilized races attribute leniency to 
timidity’, implying a military basis for Dyer’s 
reasoning, one avoided by Collett.19  
Collet argues that Dyer’s introverted mind 
consistently displayed disconnection from 
higher authority in military campaigns. This 
                                                 
15 Antony Copley. Review of The Butcher of Amritsar by 
Nigel Collett. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of 
Great Britain & Ireland, 16 (2005), p. 101. 
16 Nigel Collett, The Butcher of Amritsar: General 
Reginald Dyer (London, 2005), p. x. 
17 Shereen Ilahi (2008) The Empire of Violence: 
Strategies of British Rule in India and Ireland in the 
Aftermath of the Great War. PhD thesis. The University 
of Texas at Austin. Available at: 
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152
narrative is used to stress Dyer’s personal 
culpability for the massacre. Collett goes even 
further by suggesting that the Raj did not 
intentionally place such a volatile man in 
charge of the dangerous situation in the hope of 
his radical response. He instead contends that 
‘it looks very much as though Dyer made his 
own decision to move to Amritsar and that he 
then sought to conceal this later’.20 It is 
therefore implied that Amritsar was an 
aberration caused by one ‘half-crazed’ man’s 
decision to illegally take control. The massacre 
is completely isolated from higher authority 
and anyone but Dyer is exonerated of any 
meaningful responsibility. In pardoning army 
practices, this narrative justifies Collet’s 
military career. 
Furneaux was arguably even more 
influenced by myths of British civility. His 
idealised views led him to believe that no 
British person could behave in such a 
‘monstrous’ way. Without further explanation, 
Dyer’s actions were according to Furneaux 
‘beyond belief’.21 He went on to explain Dyer’s 
actions thus: ‘His mind became confused and 
he went on firing. It was already prey to the 
disease [Arterioscleroisis], which if he had 
been accused of murder… would have freed 
him of legal responsibility.’22 In this narrative, 
Dyer and the wider British administration are 
completely absolved and the massacre is placed 
completely outside the constructed image of 
British behaviour. Furneaux idealises Dyer 
otherwise as ‘a naturally kind and humane man, 
/24033/ilahis66937.pdf;sequence=2 (Accessed: 07 
March 2015) p. 358. 
18 Collett, Butcher of Amritsar. p.20. 
19 C. Callwell, quoted in Kim Wagner, ‘Savage Warfare: 
Violence and the Rule of Colonial Difference in Early 
British Counterinsurgency’, History Workshop Journal, 
85 (2018), p. 225. 
20 Collett, Butcher of Amritsar, p. 257. 
21Rupert Furneaux, Massacre at Amritsar (London 
1963), p. 177. 
22 Ibid., p. 179. 
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the vision of the stricken must have darkened 
his thoughts’.23 The actions at Amritsar were 
merely a brief aberration in the Britishness of 
Dyer caused by severe mental illness. Dyer’s 
later callous statements, which on the surface 
seemed cold and calculating, actually revealed 
a man wracked by guilt, clutching at 
justifications for his actions in order to live with 
them.  
Furneaux was not a historian, but an author 
of true crime. This is apparent in his approach, 
which ignores the role of precedent and instead 
reaches an ambitious conclusion, powered by 
mythic Britishness and rumour, without any 
supporting evidence of Dyer’s mental illness, 
or in fact of any panic on Dyer’s behalf. 
Quashing this idea is Dyer’s bodyguard – 
Sergeant Anderson – whose subsequent 
admission to Swinson stated that ‘Dyer seemed 
quite calm and rational’.24 Furneaux’s book 
was hence a desperate attempt to maintain the 
British myth of peaceableness, following 
Churchill’s assessment in condemning the 
event while highlighting the un-Britishness of 
the situation.  
In contrast to these British interpretations, 
which, whilst preserving the myth of 
benevolent empire by lobbying guilt on Dyer, 
did not defend his actions, Lloyd, a military 
historian, embarked upon a whitewash in 2012. 
He insinuates that Dyer’s actions are 
defendable as operating within a minimum 
force paradigm. Apparently, Dyer only kept 
firing until the crowd dispersed, a period that 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 180. 
24 Arthur Swinson, Six Minutes to Sunset: The Story of 
General Dyer and the Amritsar Affair (London 1964), p. 
28. 
25 Nick Lloyd, ‘The Amritsar Massacre and the minimum 
force debate’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21 (2010), p. 
382. 
26 Nick Lloyd, The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold Story 
of a Fateful Day (London 2011), p. xxxiii. 
27 Kim Wagner (2011), review of The Amritsar 
Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day, by Nick 
was extended due to the ‘unique’ Bagh.25 
Blame, therefore, lies not with the Raj, but with 
Dyer’s unintelligence and the potentially lathi-
armed crowd that caused him to panic, a view 
that tenuously restates Furneaux’s debunked 
argument. Lloyd argues that ‘to vilify the 
officials who were tasked with restoring order 
during such difficult times as nothing more than 
vindictive and brutal imperial oppressors is to 
misunderstand their motives and perpetuate an 
historical injustice’.26 In other words, military 
officials did their best in the trying 
circumstances. Lloyd’s argument is 
anachronistic, ignoring the racialised nature of 
the state and bearing more in common with 
Colvin’s fervent defence of British actions. 
Considering this anachronism, the result of a 
flawed methodology and biased goals, Wagner 
has derided Lloyd’s work as ‘imperial nostalgia 
of the like not seen since the heyday of the 
Morning Post’.27 Lloyd argues that ‘no amount 
of postcolonial theory’ can unmask the 
decisions leading to the massacre ‘only 
extensive research in the archival records.’28 
Archival infallibility is assumed; Lloyd 
believes in the accuracy of archival accounts 
and sees no necessity to interrogate the material 
and identify gaps.  
Military historians consistently focus on 
the archives due to their reductionist approach 
that is focused on uncovering contemporary 
reasons for the success, or failure, of an 
engagement.29 However, evidence has 
increasingly shown that British archives are
Lloyd. Available 
at http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1224. 
(Accessed: 5 March 2018). 
28 Nick Lloyd (2011), author’s response to Kim Wagner 
(2011), review of The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold 
Story of One Fateful Day, by Nick Lloyd. Available 
at http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/1224. 
(Accessed: 5 March 2018). 
29 Taylor Sherman, State Violence and Punishment in 
India (New York 2010), p. 21. 
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unreliable. A recent study by Caroline Elkins 
on the Mau-Mau rebellion indicated that three-
and-a-half tons of archival files in Kenya that 
detailed brutal government repression were 
disposed of, whilst files directly referencing the 
‘British’ way, were kept.30 Elkins firmly 
criticises military historians (in this case Huw 
Bennet) who ‘fetishize’ archives.31 Taylor 
Sherman has consistently argued that archival 
over-emphasis obscures the intrinsically 
important yet informal spectacle of colonial 
control in India, thus incorrectly emphasising 
the mythic British rule of law.32 Lloyd’s 
reductionist conclusions concerning the Raj’s 
competence are therefore unsurprising.  
Equally problematic in Lloyd’s assessment 
of colonial guilt is his attempt to diminish 
British violence; he utilises an epilogue 
referencing larger post-colonial death tolls to 
this end. He states that ’looking at the violence 
in the Punjab in 1984…gives the lie to the 
accusation that the British ruled the Punjab with 
anything approaching the ‘iron fist’ of 
legend’.33 Such an approach bears similarity to 
Gilley’s widely derided colonial apologist 
rhetoric in ‘The Case for Colonialism’, which 
argues that colonial rule is justified by the 
failures of post-colonial states.34 Lloyd’s 
approach exemplifies the historiographical 
danger often generated by imperial apologists. 
Comparative history should not be abused to 
                                                 
30 Caroline Elkins cited in Patricia Owens, Economy of 
Force, p. 179. 
31 Caroline Elkins. Review of Fighting the Mau Mau: 
The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya 
Emergency, by Huw Bennett (Cambridge, 2013) in The 
American Historical Review, 119, (2014), p. 654. 
32 Taylor Sherman, State Violence and Punishment in 
India, p. 21. 
33 Lloyd, Massacre at Amritsar, p. 208. 
34 Bruce Gilley, ‘The Case for Colonialism’, Third World 
Quarterly, pp.1-17. Available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2017.1369037 
(Accessed: 5 February 2018). 
35 The Times (2014) SAS ‘helped to plan Amritsar 
Massacre’. Available at 
relativise guilt; this is an inherently reductive 
approach. Lloyd ignores the fact that the British 
massacre yielded zero British casualties, 
whereas the Indian forces in 1984 – when 
India’s Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, ordered 
a military operation to remove Sikh militants 
from the Golden Temple – recorded 84 dead 
and over 100 wounded. Files released two years 
after Lloyd’s publication implicated British 
government sanctioned SAS involvement in 
the planning of the attack, demonstrating 
Lloyd’s completely untenable apologist 
focus.35  
British historiography is clearly defined by 
a preoccupation with enhancing global 
respectability. Parallel to invasions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan, military historians sought 
justification in advocating Britain’s specific 
skill in counter-insurgency using ‘minimum 
force’; they specifically referenced colonial 
actions. 36 Andrew Roberts, a fervent 
whitewasher of the massacre upon whom Lloyd 
builds, supports British counter-insurgency, 
advocating ‘an active part in defending 
decency’ with the UK's being ‘one of the 
world’s foremost moral policemen’.37 
Therefore, it is in the interest of certain military 
historians to wrongly create a narrative of the 
Amritsar massacre which sanitises army 
practice and protects British morality.  
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/sas-helped-to-plan-
amritsar-massacre-8qt6fnd98fx (Accessed: 21 April 
2018). 
36 Wagner, ‘Savage Warfare’, p. 2. 
37 Andrew Roberts, A History of the English-Speaking 
Peoples Since 1900 (London 2008) p. 153; Andrew 
Roberts quoted in Daily Mail (2013) Hideously amoral 
Little England has stepped through the looking glass: A 
top historian's deeply personal - and inflammatory - 
critique of where Britain now stands on the world stage. 
Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-
2408040/ANDREW-ROBERTS-Hideously-amoral-
Little-England-stepped-looking-glass.html. (Accessed: 
31 March 2018). 
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The narrow focus of British historians on 
the character of Dyer is also deeply 
problematic. Furneaux and Lloyd both argue 
that Dyer panicked and changed his argument 
in the face of Anglo-Indian opinion. They 
consider how Dyer was raised a pension fund 
of 26,000 shillings, gifted a jewelled sword and 
declared by Kipling to be the ‘saviour of the 
Raj’, yet both say little of the character of this 
widespread opinion and how it powerfully 
implies that Dyer was unexceptional. 38 It is 
debatable that even within the limited scope of 
the British in Amritsar Dyer was not the most 
radical. Cousens points out that one surgeon 
suggested dealing with the crowd through 
aerial bombardment, compared to which 
Dyer’s response appears almost subdued.39 A 
day after the massacre, three RAF planes 
bombed and machine-gunned Gujranwala. 
Official reports claimed 16 casualties, but 
nationalist historians have indicated over 100 
as dying in an event Horniman claims could 
have been resolved with a dozen policemen.40 
On this basis, it was the British response that 
was hysterical, not simply Dyer’s. Anglo-
Indian support is unsurprising in this context. 
Dyer was neither unique within the Raj nor 
Amritsar in the history of the British empire. 
Therefore, to attempt to explain the event 
through either a ‘unique and dangerous 
personality’, is to obscure the commonality of 
his mindset and to whitewash the British 
empire. It is therefore imperative to look 
                                                 
38 Furneaux, ‘Massacre at Amritsar’, p. 180; Lloyd, 
‘Minimum Force Debate’, p. 401. 
39 Richard, Cousens, ‘Amritsar to Basra: the influence of 
counter-insurgency on the British perspective of peace-
keeping’ in R.Utley eds. Major Powers and 
Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the 
Challenges of Military Intervention (Aldershoot, 2006). 
P. 59.  
40 Tarlochan Nahal, ‘Ghadar Movement: Its Origin and 
Impact on Jallianwala Bagh Massacre and Indian 
Freedom Struggle’, p. 22. A paper presented at the 
Eastern Scholars Conference for the Sikh Centennial 
beyond the individuality of Dyer to determine 
the reasoning behind the hysterical British 
response, as the Indian nationalist 
historiography has done, albeit in a highly 
biased and limited fashion.  
Indian historiographies have promoted the 
idea that Amritsar was the murderous event that 
revealed the true face of British brutality and 
hence forced the eventual independence of 
India. The massacre was the planned 
punishment of Indians for daring to challenge 
the British and this blatant cruelty crystallised 
nationalism, an argument first put forward by 
Pearay Mohan.41 Indian historiography clearly 
glorifies the nationalist movement. Whilst 
British historiographies have assumed 
singularity and embellished this with rumour, 
Indian historiographies have been guilty of 
similar malpractice in seeking to construct an 
unsubstantiated intentionalist narrative. A 
leading Indian scholar of the massacre, Datta, 
views Amritsar as ‘the consequence of a clash 
between British policies and Indian 
opinion…an expression of a confrontation 
between ruler and ruled’. 42 The need for Indian 
independence is stressed, and that Amritsar 
showed India reaching incompatibility with 
British rule. Datta then draws on Colvin’s 
uncited biography of Dyer and a supposed 
remark by Dyer to his wife of the necessity to 
get the rebels ‘somehow in the open’ to 
tenuously connect his interpretation to a 
conspiracy between Dyer and an informant.43
Celebrations. Available at 
https://www.academia.edu/6850251/Ghadar_Movement
_Its_Origin_and_Impact_on_Jallianwala_Bagh_Massac
re_and_Indian_Freedom_Struggle (Accessed: 21 March 
2018); Benjamin Horniman, British Administration and 
the Amritsar Massacre (Delhi 1920), p. 157. 
41 Pearay Mohan, cited by Savita Nahrain, 
Historiography of Jallianwala Bagh, p. 4. 
42 V. N. Datta, Jallianwala Bagh (Ludhiana, 1969), p. 
168. 
43 Ian Colvin, cited in Ibid., p. 169. 
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Datta argues, ‘[i]n view of the elaborate 
arrangements made by Hans Raj and the CID to 
assemble the crowd in the Bagh and keep it 
there it is obvious that Dyer was primarily 
motivated by revenge.’44 However, despite 
Datta’s assertion that it is ‘obvious’, he does not 
illustrate an obvious link between Hans Raj and 
Dyer. He relies instead on rumour and hearsay, 
exemplifying poor culpability-motivated 
scholarship.  
Unsubstantiated conspiracies that 
simultaneously glorify Indian nationalism and 
condemn British authority are also a trait of 
Raja Ram’s narrative found in The Jallianwala 
Bagh Massacre: A Premeditated Plot. Ram 
diverts the guilt of the massacre away from 
Dyer, arguing ‘Dyer performed his duty with 
thoroughness, according to the direction of his 
superiors.’45 Such an interpretation is far more 
valuable to Indian nationalists, suggesting that 
it was higher authority that directed the 
unprecedented murder. Ram, an Indian 
historian, claims that ‘O’Dwyer thought out a 
stratagem. It consisted of two stages: first to 
provoke the innocent masses to commit 
violence somehow, and then make a pretext to 
pounce upon them and crush them through 
force.’46 In this narrative, Ram fulfils all 
nationalist goals. He exonerates the crowds of 
guilt for the violence preceding the massacre, 
proposing it was in fact planned by a strong, 
calculating and brutal state. Ram depicts the 
callous actions of the British to maximum 
effect, utilising the distinction between Gandhi 
and the British. However, Ram, as does Datta, 
provides no real evidence for his conspiracy 
theory. Ram’s argument should be dismissed as 
much as Furneaux’s desperate defence of 
                                                 
44 Datta, Jallianwala Bagh, p. 170. 
45 Raja Ram, The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre: A 
Premeditated Plan. (Chandigarh 1969) p. 140. 
46 Ram, Premeditated Plan, pp. 138-139. 
47 Sayer, ‘British Reaction’, p. 133. 
British civility.47 Begum Ikramullah strikingly 
illustrates the issues raised by the nationalist 
Indian view concerning British guilt: “The 
death-knell of the British Empire was sounded 
the day General Dyer ordered the firing on 
4,000 unarmed people…It provided the Indians 
with just the weapon they needed to whip up 
hatred…it gave [the] British the overwhelming 
feeling of guilt which had to be redeemed by 
giving India self-government.”48 
This account ignores that the British 
avoided direct responsibility for the massacre 
and the fact that it took Britain almost 30 years 
to grant India independence. By suggesting that 
it was ‘guilt’ that led to independence, British 
rule is firmly discredited. However, Ikramullah 
fails to acknowledge that similar actions had 
occurred previously, a stance that indirectly 
empowers the British narrative that the 
massacre was singular and exceptional. This 
narrative is therefore wrong on several levels. 
It was because the empire’s typically repressive 
actions at Jallianwala Bagh clashed with a 
national movement that it had such an effect, 
not because it was a cruel escalation of 
violence. Tuteja has disagreed with opinions 
that define the national movement in Punjab as 
initially weak, arguing instead that the Punjab 
‘communitarian consciousness’ which had 
been developing alongside economic and 
political changes since the 1870s had ‘real 
potential for the evolution of a nationalist 
perspective’.49 Nonetheless, the massacre is 
still used as a symbol of disproportionate 
punishment by an over-powerful state. Nahal 
proposed in 2012 that ‘[t]he Jallianwala Bagh 
Massacre occurred because people opposed the 
oppressive and draconian Rowlatt Bills…it 
48 Begum Shaista Suhrawardy Ikramullah, Huseyn 
Shaheed Suhrawardy: A Biography (Karachi 1991), p. 2, 
quoted in Ilahi, Empire of Violence, p. 7. 
49 K.L Tuteja, ‘Jallianwala Bagh: A Critical Juncture in 
the Indian National Movement’, Social Scientist, 25 
(1997), p. 36.  
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could only have happened with O’Dwyer’s 
express approval’.50 This assessment indicates 
the contemporary persistence of nationalist 
simplification and fuels Tharoor’s 
misconceptions regarding the triumphant 
brutality of the British.51 
Post-colonial theory has allowed a binary 
British or Indian historiography to be expanded 
beyond nationalist lines and challenged. In 
1977, the American Helen Fein brought a 
sociological perspective strongly influenced by 
post-colonial thought and building upon 
Durkheim’s ideas of crime and punishment. 
Fein argues that the otherness of India, 
developed through the social distancing 
fundamental to British life in India, meant that, 
upon opposing their rulers, Indians could be 
slaughtered for punishment without moral 
qualms. Therefore, the massacre was 
‘objectively a crime against the victims but 
understood by its perpetrators as a 
punishment.’52 Fein implies that explanation 
for the atrocity lies with the structure of 
racialised imperialism in India and not simply 
the morality of individuals, an assessment 
giving weight to Indian narratives. Seemingly 
supporting this argument is one of the few 
accounts to have endorsed the massacre. 
Swinson – an ex-British officer turned military 
historian who published an account of the 
massacre in 1964 – emphasises the otherness of 
the crowd in his depiction of the attack on 
Marcella Sherwood. Sherwood was an English 
schoolteacher who was attacked on the streets 
of Amritsar during riots two days before the 
massacre. Swinson claims that the ‘mob 
howling and screeching like savages returned 
to the attack’, using animalistic analogy to 
                                                 
50 Nahal. ‘Ghadar Movement’, p. 1. 
51 Nahal. ‘Ghadar Movement’, p. 1. 
52 Helen Fein, Imperial Crime and Punishment: The 
Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgement, 
1919-1920. (Honolulu 1977), p. x. 
emphasise their sub-humanity.53 Swinson 
believed that the Jallianwala Bagh crowd was 
largely made up of the same rioters, again 
‘being incited to murder and rebellion by the 
leaders’ (an uncited claim), justifying their 
punishment.54 According to structuralism, 
therefore, the space that Indians occupied 
within the ‘moral universe’ of imperialism 
allowed them to be slaughtered, diminishing 
the apparent singularity of the massacre via the 
argument that it was a symptom of a racialised 
state. However, an issue with the sociological 
approach is its degree of assumption and 
analysis of the massacre within a narrow frame 
– there is a distinct lack of historical context. 
Neither approach fully explains why Dyer 
killed such a large number and why the reaction 
was so panicked and hysterical, bringing to 
mind Bailkin’s observation of the ’banality’ of 
colonial violence.55   
Fein oversimplifies complex British 
attitudes to civility. The British viewed 
themselves as raised from a savage state by 
Romans and vested with a responsibility to pass 
this civility to other groups. Derek Sayer, 
therefore, argues that the British felt deep 
paternalism to their subjects, whom they 
considered would revert to savagery without 
guidance, as did the children in The Lord of the 
Flies. It was their responsibility to father the 
‘less developed’ nation. Backing this up is 
Dyer’s statement that he believed that the 
massacre would do the people ‘a jolly lot of 
good’.56 This attitude supposedly explains the 
supportive British reaction; they believed in 
their ‘horrible duty’ to keep Indians on the right 
track.57 British civility was, however, often 
infused with anxiety rather than triumph, due to
53 Swinson, Six Minutes to Sunset, p. 22. 
54 Ibid., p. 101.  
55 Bailkin, ‘The Boot and the Spleen’, p. 466. 
56 Dyer, quoted in Sayer, ‘British Reaction’, p. 146. 
57 Ibid., p. 140. 
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the prevalent belief that civility could be 
diminished within a savage environment just as 
it had been attained from the Romans.  
A consistent assumption within the 
aforementioned historiographies regards the 
perceived strength of the Raj, either as 
generally competent and well-intentioned as 
Lloyd argued, or as strong and brutally 
vengeful, as described by Ram and Fein. 
However, Sherman has highlighted that states 
needed to rely on informal spectacles of power 
to survive. The massacre was part of an 
interconnected ‘coercive system’ and hence not 
extraordinary in style, only scale. The 
sociological otherness of the Indian stressed by 
Swinson created fear amongst the British, not 
triumphant brutality, that they themselves 
could revert to ‘savagery’. Mark Condos has 
concluded that the Raj was defined by 
insecurity and self-perceived weakness, 
indicating that the massacre should be analysed 
in terms of the reasoning behind its precedential 
anxiety, not its empire-ending aftermath and 
the inevitable declarations of guilt.58 The 
massacre should be approached not from a 
standpoint that seeks to assign blame, but from 
one searching for what was truly important to 
the Anglo-Indian. Considering the 
controversial basis of historiographies that 
have accessed the massacre in isolation, a 
‘thicker periodisation’ of the massacre is 
needed, one free from politicised rumour. Even 
Ram himself conceded that ‘what actually 
transpired among the few top civil and military 
officers of the Government in the evening of 
the 9th of April, nobody can know’.59 
 
                                                 
58 Mark Condos, The Insecurity State, pp. 1-10. 
59 Ram, Premeditated Plan, p. 176. 
60Foucault quoted in Taylor Sherman, ‘Tensions of 
colonial punishment: perspectives on recent 
developments in the study of coercive networks in Asia, 
The Jallianwala Bagh massacre in 
comparative perspective 
The historiographical approaches outlined have 
largely been deficient, in either their 
ambitiously politicised framings of guilt or 
their failure to fully explain Dyer’s actions. 
More fruitful perspectives have been allowed 
by the increasing analysis of colonial violence. 
Accompanying this has been a recent shift of 
historiographical focus from imprisonment, the 
idea by Michel Foucault that ‘over the past two 
centuries, the deprivation of liberty has 
replaced other forms of punishment’, to study 
of colonial penal practices, as explored by 
Sherman.60 Dan Stone has indicated the 
persistence of a ‘screen memory effect’ with 
regards to historiography, that the 
incomparable horror of the Holocaust 
‘conceptually prohibits inquiry into Britain’s 
own historical record.’61 Progressive research 
into colonial violence, however, has been 
fuelled by the continued advancement of 
Holocaust historiography and genocide studies 
in seeking the role of precedent. Michelle 
Gordon’s work on the dynamics of colonial 
violence has revealed the presence of consistent 
factors such as misjudgement, precedential 
memory and poor communication. These are 
all applicable to Amritsar. Kim Wagner, a 
Danish-British historian who has focused on 
1857, takes a broader approach to the massacre 
than previous historians by recognising long-
term continuities in the anxieties that drove 
each incidence. Amritsar appears similar to a 
firing squad, harking back to the ritual of public 
execution, the ritualised blowing of Indians 
from guns, which terrified the populace post-
Africa and the Caribbean’, History compass, 7 (2009), p. 
665. 
61 Dan Stone, quoted in, Michelle Gordon, ‘Colonial 
Violence and Holocaust Studies’, Holocaust Studies, 21 
(2015), p. 273. 
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1857.62 Therefore, Wagner argues, it ‘is thus to 
1857 that we must look for an understanding of 
the Amritsar massacre’.63 Wagner also equates 
these episodes with the mistaken situation of 
the lesser-known 1872 killings. In 1872, the 
‘Kooka outbreak’, involved the summary 
killing of sixty-eight prisoners in the aftermath 
of a minor rebellion in a principality of Punjab. 
Like Amritsar, this caused a public relations 
issue at home; the threat of the rebellion had 
been limited and the killings were undertaken 
after peace had returned. As with Dyer, the 
perpetrator was heavily criticised at home but 
received the support of Anglo-Indians at large 
as he had supposedly prevented an uprising.64  
Counter to arguments focusing on 
punishment and culpability, Wagner argues 
‘the guilt of the individuals was more or less 
irrelevant to the real purpose of the spectacle of 
violence… the performance of colonial power 
pure and simple.’65 Dyer’s rhetoric, consistent 
with other instigators of colonial violence, 
described victims not as rioters to be punished 
but ‘rebels’ to be feared and cowered. 
Therefore, Dyer was following precedented 
action. It was a decision to react to what it was 
imagined the disturbances could become, a 
mindset typical within the British Empire. 
Colonel Anson before dealing with 
disturbances in Penang claimed, ‘just before 
leaving England I had read the entire account 
of General Eyre’s riots in Jamaica, having no 
one on whose advice I could rely…I felt 
doubtful and somewhat nervous to the actions I 
should take’. 66 Implicated is that in their 
isolation and anxiety, colonial officials were 
informed by memory, not the reality of 
situations. Dyer feared the isolation of his small 
                                                 
62 Kim Wagner, ‘Calculated to Strike Terror’, p. 189. 
63 Ibid., p. 196. 
64 Ibid., pp. 206-210. 
65 Ibid., p. 196.  
66 Colonel Anson, quoted in Gordon M. ‘The Dynamics 
of British Colonial Violence’ in P. Dwyer, A. Nettelbeck 
force within a large, hostile city and looked 
back to the spectre of the mutiny.  
Exemplary violence was the typical action 
believed to cower ‘uncivilised’ rebels, as 
informed by the ‘civilising mission’. However, 
British confidence imbued by the successful 
memory of exemplary force was misplaced and 
often had the opposite effect of securing rule in 
the long term. Considering its supposed 
efficacy post the mutiny, this myth was deeply 
embedded. This is demonstrated by Kipling’s 
explicit reference in 1890 to the specific utility 
of exemplary violence.67 Discourses of civility 
informed action up to Amritsar. Colonel 
Jervois said of the Perak, ‘it would be insane to 
suppose that we have finally tamed the most 
turbulent of races by a few sharp defeats in 
jungle skirmishes and the burning of a few 
stockades’. Therefore, in order to avoid a 
drawn-out skirmish which would overrun the 
fragile coercive system, Jervois advised 
enacting ‘an imposing display of force’, 
through which ‘future difficulties would 
cease’.68 Such an attitude reveals the fear 
present of ‘savages’ within the British, but also 
the pre-emptive nature of exemplary violence. 
Officials did not react simply to what was in 
front of them, but to what they imagined 
disturbances could become. The power of the 
mutiny motif pushed exemplary violence; it 
was assumed any future difficulty could be a 
repeated mutiny. Paralleling this was the 1919 
statement of a senior officer in Delhi that ‘force 
is the only thing that an Asiatic has any respect 
(ed.) Violence, Colonialism and Empire in the Modern 
World. (Cambridge 2018), p. 165. 
67 Kipling, cited in Wagner, ‘Calculated to Strike Terror’, 
p. 210. 
68 Jervois, quoted in Gordon ‘Dynamics of Colonial 
Violence’, p. 156.  
  
 
2020   |   The South Asianist 7: 18-34   |   pg. 30 
for’.69 Similarities of dealings in the Penang 
and Perak thus show the empire-wide nature of 
Dyer’s mindset through the nineteenth century 
and hence the meaningless nature of 
Churchill’s singular condemnation. 
However, in opposition to the purely 
nationalist argument advanced by Tharoor that 
Amritsar was operated in triumphant British 
revenge, Wagner argues that exemplary 
violence was enacted ‘not merely to preserve 
law and order, but to preserve their own 
lives’.70 This ties in with Sherman’s argument 
that the coercive system was in fact weak and 
easily overwhelmed, leading Sherman to 
maintain that in a crisis, ‘tactics tended to be 
overwhelmingly collective and often violent’. 
This highlights colonial anxiety and panic, as 
the ‘insecurity state’ in 1919 was faced with the 
spectre of being overcome by a second 
‘mutiny’ (which in fact it was not).71 The 
brutality of British exemplary violence 
throughout the empire from 1857-1919 ranged 
from the Hut Tax war and violence in Perak, to 
the Amritsar massacre. This proliferation was 
arguably a consequence of indelible memory 
and ‘civilised’ concepts about the efficacy of 
exemplary violence. These factors when 
combined with the often-isolated man on the 
ground, forced through poor communication to 
rely on memory and ‘discretionary powers’, led 
to disproportionate reactions to imagined crises 
due to colonial panic.72 An explanation for the 
Amritsar massacre hence lies with the idea of 
imperialism being the dominion of a few 
‘civilised’ people over a large group of 
‘savages’, the methods needed to sustain this 
morally bankrupt balance of power, and the 
powerful anxieties awoken once the idea that 
these ‘savages’ could rebel had taken hold. 
                                                 
69 Brigadier-General D. H. Drake-Brockman, quoted in 
Wagner, ‘Calculated to Strike Terror’, p. 196. 
70 Ibid., p. 190. 
71 Sherman, State Violence and Punishment, p. 14. 
72 Ibid., p. 17. 
However, as the inevitabilities of the moral 
bankruptcy of colonialism did not align with 
the constructed image of the British empire (as 
based on the rule of law), Amritsar needed to 
be depicted as exceptional to preserve the 
construction of the British.  
The recurrence of marginalisation and a 
historiographical pattern of guilt-avoidance can 
be found through the study of lesser-known 
British historiographies of colonial violence. 
For instance, the Zululand massacres during the 
1879 Anglo-Zulu war, 40 years preceding 
Amritsar. For many years the historiography of 
the war accepted the orthodoxy of glorifying a 
conflict between well-matched opponents, the 
honourable British and savagely noble Zulus.73 
Fitting best with this characterisation was the 
battle of Rorke’s Drift. However, depictions of 
instances where British troops ruthlessly killed 
wounded Zulus were represented in the 
historiography as condemned incidents of 
individual vengeance.74 Strikingly analogous is 
the British claim by Churchill and the British 
historiography that the Jallianwala Bagh 
massacre was both deplorable, singular and 
individually attributable to Dyer. Lieven has on 
a re-examination of contemporary sources 
concerning the Zululand massacres concluded 
that the murders were not merely attributable to 
individualised revenge, but a system of 
massacre and total war, where the British ‘were 
only saved from a policy of genocide by the 
capture of the Zulu king’.75 Therefore, guilt 
should not lie with individuals. Lieven argues 
that ‘the slaughter of the enemy after battle, was 
not as most historians have suggested an 
overreaction by the white troops… but an 
essential but unacknowledged part of British 
73 Michael Lieven, ‘Butchering the Brutes All Over the 
Place’: Total War and Massacre in Zululand, 1879’, 
History, 84 (1999), p. 616. 
74 Ibid., p. 616. 
75 Ibid., p. 613. 
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strategy…emerging from the pathology of 
empire when confronted with defeat’.76  
This ‘unacknowledged’ part of British 
strategy is arguably the concurrent pathology 
present in Dyer, which also led him to slaughter 
the helpless in response to extreme colonial 
anxiety, fearing of defeat. Whilst the setting, 
time and situation of the Zululand massacres is 
radically different, it is telling that in both cases 
historians wrongly diminished guilt through 
similar methodologies and modelling. Wagner 
argues that it is ‘moments of acute vulnerability 
(real and imagined) that reveal the inner 
workings of colonial rule’. It was easy for 
colonialism to appear benign when not 
confronted; it was only when challenged that 
this racist ‘unacknowledged strategy’ which 
upheld the insecurity that was colonialism 
came out.77 By analysing crises small and large, 
the British response to the Amritsar crisis does 
not, therefore, seem anomalous, but the typical 
pathology of an empire ordinarily based on 
ideas of civility when confronted with real or 
imagined defeat.  
A British prime minister has never issued 
an official apology for the massacre despite 
that, as this essay shows, it is symptomatic of 
an empire-wide pathology. David Cameron’s 
2013 statement when he became the first 
serving British Prime minister to visit the Bagh 
therefore appears thoroughly outdated. It 
reveals the success of the marginalisation of 
exemplary violence, the promotion of mythic 
Britishness and the prevailing influence of the 
highly problematic Churchill in British 
historiographies. Indian descendants of victims 
                                                 
76 Ibid., p. 616. 
77 Wagner, ‘Calculated to Strike Terror’, p. 190. 
78 David Cameron, quoted in BBC News (2013) David 
Cameron marks British 1919 Amritsar massacre. 
Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
21515360 (Accessed: 05 February 2018). 
79 BBC News (2013) Amritsar massacre families: 
Cameron 'should have said sorry'. Available at 
hoped for an apology and claimed one could 
assist in healing past wounds. Cameron, 
however, stopped at describing Amritsar as 
‘deeply shameful’. This failure is especially 
questionable when considering Trudeau’s 2016 
national apology to India.78 Responding to 
Cameron’s failure, a victim’s grandchild 
questioned ‘[i]f he said it is shameful, why did 
he not apologise?’.79 The answer is that 
Cameron did not consider it a matter of national 
guilt or policy as Trudeau did. He instead 
followed the orthodoxy of believing in its 
uniqueness. Cameron argued that ‘we are 
dealing with something …which Winston 
Churchill described as “monstrous” at the time 
and the British government rightly 
condemned.’ Cameron subsequently claimed 
‘there is an enormous amount to be proud of in 
what the British Empire did and was 
responsible for.’80 Cameron implies that what 
Dyer did was atypical of the British Empire, 
reiterating that the occasional massacring of 
citizens was justified by the empire overall 
being a force for good. That Cameron sees 
responsibility for the tragedy not in a pathology 
of empire was clear in his statement that ‘those 
who were responsible were rightly criticised at 
the time’.81 This is despite Dyer having 
received huge support and never receiving 
formal punishment.  
Although, as this essay has shown, the 
myth of the British Empire being exceptional is 
one based on historiographical marginalisation, 
it is one that still prevails. The MP Liam Fox 
tweeted in 2016 that ‘the United Kingdom is 
one of the few countries in the European Union
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-21519719 
(Accessed: 05 February 2018). 
80 David Cameron, quoted in The Guardian (2013) David 
Cameron defends lack of apology for British massacre at 
Amritsar. Available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/feb/20/davi
d-cameron-amritsar-massacre-india (Accessed: 05 
February 2018). 
81 David Cameron, quoted in Ibid.  
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that does not need to bury its twentieth-century 
history.’82 Regarding the nostalgic way in 
which the empire is still politically regarded, an 
apology in 2019 could, therefore, be inherently 
unhelpful. It would inevitably feature a 
carefully worded reemphasis of the singularity 
of Amritsar and a meaningless apology on 
behalf of Dyer and not the British Empire, 
especially when one considers that Boris 
Johnson quoted Kipling upon visiting Burma in 
2017. History should remember Amritsar as a 
tragic illustration of the morality of colonialism 
and not avoid this in a carefully worded 
apology. Nonetheless, it could be argued that 
this is an irrelevant view; an apology is hoped 
for by the descendants of victims and they 
therefore deserve one, whatever its 
implications.  
In this essay, several conclusions have 
been reached. Firstly, that mythic Britishness is 
something that obscures reality. If the British 
Empire was less brutal, it was by degree and not 
exception. This exceptional image has been 
created by assigning guilt to individuals, 
something shown by increasing research into 
colonial violence by genocide scholars. 
Considering an event singular obscures long-
term continuities. Counter to C.F. Andrews’ 
assertion that in the massacre ‘British honour 
departed’, it is debatable that this honour and 
the ideology of ‘minimum force’ ever 
specifically existed; slaughter was often the 
British way of conducting savage warfare.83 
Secondly, historiographies approaching an 
event with a specific narrative seeking to assign 
guilt are inherently reductive and therefore 
often poor scholarship. This has been 
demonstrated through the oft poorly cited, 
                                                 
82 Liam Fox (2016) [Twitter] 4 March. Available at 
https://twitter.com/LiamFox/status/7056740610163875
84 (Accessed: 21 February 2018).  
83 C.F Andrews, quoted in Bhupinder Singh, The Anti-
British Movements: From Gadar Lehar to Kirtsti Kisan 
Lehar. PhD Thesis. Punjabi University, Patiali. 
politicised British and Indian historiographies 
of the massacre. The most important and 
revealing method is hence comparative, to 
place the massacre within a long durée in order 
to understand how it could have occurred. 
Dyer’s actions were proportional in the 
imaginations of him and many other 
colonialists, fuelled by intense fear and not 
inherent racist hatred. Memory strongly shaped 
events, and to ignore it is hence incredibly 
neglectful. This is not to condone British 
actions, but to consider that history is far too 
complex to be reductively analysed within a 
pride or shame paradigm, something attempted 
by Nigel Biggar in the derided ‘ethics and 
empire’ project. Britain’s intentions regarding 
the civilising mission were not innately 
immoral, yet its impact could be considered so. 
Relativising guilt is similarly reductive and 
unhelpful; that the 1984 attack on the Golden 
Temple was named the ‘Amritsar Massacre’ 
within Britain appears a deliberate obfuscation. 
Considering that the 1919 Amritsar massacre is 
therefore innately misunderstood globally, 
Tharoor’s suggestion of education is the 
necessary step. The empire is nothing to be 
proud of. It was, as with any colonial project, 
sustained by exemplary violence.  
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